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R E S U LT S

The Pros and Cons of Comprehensive
Community Initiatives at the City Level:
The Case of the Urban Health Initiative
Diana Silver, Ph.D., M.P.H., Department of Nutrition, Food Studies and Public Health, Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development, New York University; Beth C.
Weitzman, Ph.D., Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University

Key Points
· This article describes the trade-offs between the
city-level and neighborhood-based approaches in
examining the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s
(RWJF’s) Urban Health Initiative (UHI), an $80 million, 10-year effort to improve the health and safety
of young people.
· Eight cities engaged in a two-year planning process; five received funding for an eight-year implementation phase. Plans that engaged in bottom-up
activities, but left power and control in the hands of
civic, business, social service, and political leaders,
were favored. Those who had focused exclusively
on neighborhood-based approaches were not
funded for implementation.
· RWJF chose a city-level focus because they believed neighborhood-level initiatives lacked the political clout to make sustainable changes in programs,
institutions, systems, and policies. Furthermore,

Introduction
The definition of a comprehensive community
initiative (CCI) is, depending on one’s viewpoint,
maddeningly imprecise or wonderfully flexible.
CCIs are described as an approach to addressing
social problems, generally described in terms of
a set of common characteristics (Kubisch, Weiss,
Schorr, & Connell, 1995; Rich, Emrey, & West,
1999; Austin & Lemon, 2005). Sharing several key
tenets, CCIs are

poor outcomes for children were not concentrated
in a few neighborhoods, but were found in a substantial portion of the city’s communities.
· The UHI sites were successful in bringing existing
efforts quickly under their umbrella, strengthening
them by bringing added resources, data, technical expertise, and visibility. With citywide focus
and leadership, the power between the initiative
and local philanthropy was made more balanced.
However, the fragmented nature of government
service delivery systems at the city level created
new obstacles to change in some cases.
· The UHI’s citywide focus meant that some of the
important roles that neighborhood comprehensive
community initiatives have assumed went unfilled.
For instance, attention devoted during planning
to cultural norms and values that might influence
health and safety outcomes quickly ebbed during
implementation.

concerns, even as they may initially focus on a
single problem;
• engaged in long-term, strategic communitybuilding efforts;
• focused on building social capital, leadership,
and community capacity (Fulbright-Anderson
& Auspos, 2006; Kubisch et al., 1997).

CCIs have addressed mental health concerns
(Emshoff et al., 2007; Holden, Friedman, & Santiago, 2001), employment for low-income people
• collaborative in their governance and strategies; (Silver, 2004), neighborhood improvement
(Foster-Fishman et al., 2006), and coordina• holistic, encompassing a broad range of policy
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tion of social services (Procello & Nelson, 2002;
Meister and De Zapien, 2005; Kreger, Brindis,
Manuel, & Sassoubre, 2007). The emphasis of
CCIs has been largely at a subjurisdictional, typically neighborhood, level. Fewer have intervened
citywide.

The decision to intervene at the
city level provided increased
opportunity to build political power
and create meaningful changes in
public and private systems. It also
impeded the kind of community
building more typically associated
with CCI's.
Yet, in 1996, for its Urban Health Initiative (UHI),
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF)
funded collaborative efforts in distressed US cities
to improve the health and safety of their young
people citywide. Well over 1 million children and
youth stood to benefit. Eight cities were funded
for two years of planning; five cities — Baltimore,
Md.; Detroit, Mich.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Oakland,
Calif.; and Richmond, Va. — received funds for
eight years of implementation. UHI embraced the
core tenets of CCIs, involving political, philanthropic, business, and nonprofit leadership (e.g.,
the civic elite) in the participating cities to create
changes in systems affecting children and youth
citywide.
To realize their vision, the RWJF invested approximately $80 million in UHI. These monies
were directed to the sites but were also used to
fund the National Program Office (NPO), the
national evaluation of the initiative, a National
Advisory Committee, and a seminar series on
relevant research. The NPO brought the site
leadership together several times a year during
the planning process, then once a year thereafter. They oversaw and monitored the progress
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of each of the sites through regular visits and
phone calls and hired a variety of experts to
provide technical assistance to the sites over
the course of the initiative. In addition, they
organized an annual visit to a non-UHI city and
brought as many as 20 staff members and city
leaders from each site. Many of these city leaders
were invited to become UHI fellows and began
attending annual UHI meetings. UHI fellows
were enlisted to contribute their expertise and
leadership to site activities.
In addition, the national evaluation team, based at
New York University, provided technical assistance to help the sites use data and manage their
local evaluation efforts. RWJF also funded a semiannual two-day seminar convened by William
Julius Wilson at Harvard University; the seminar
brought together site directors with prominent
scholars in the fields of economics, sociology, psychology, education, and health to feed research
into practice in the field.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of choosing a citywide focus over a neighborhood one.
We begin with RWJF’s rationale for choosing to
intervene at the city level. Next, we examine how
that decision influenced the planning process in
the UHI cities. We discuss how the citywide focus
shaped the roles assumed by the sites in implementing their plans, and the activities undertaken. We demonstrate that the decision to intervene
at the city level provided increased opportunity
to build political power and create meaningful
changes in public and private systems. However,
it also impeded the kind of community building
more typically associated with CCIs and surfaced
a different set of challenges to improving the lives
of children and youth.

Data and Methods
This paper makes use of data collected for UHI’s
national evaluation, which has been described
elsewhere (Weitzman, Silver, & Dillman, 2002).
We reviewed information collected during annual
site visits and key informant interviews (conducted every 18 months) and analyzed site documents. We also drew on our work in producing
and revising the UHI Theory of Change (abbrevi-
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& Fiester, 2007) or the Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation’s Neighborhood Partners Initiative
(Chaskin, 2000), lacked the political clout to
make sustainable changes in programs, instituWhat Was the Rationale for Using a
tions, systems, and policies that affect the lives
Citywide Approach?
A growing body of literature examines the ways in of low-income communities (Jellinek, 2008).
which low-income neighborhoods further impov- Further, RWJF was interested in working in
economically distressed cities, where poor outerish low-income people residing in them (e.g.,
comes for children were not concentrated in a
Wilson, 1987; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov,
few neighborhoods but were found in a substan& Sealand, 1993). Such research has led policytial portion of the city’s communities. For RWJF,
makers, practitioners, and researchers to renew
improving the life of distressed urban communiefforts to improve neighborhood conditions.
Some have argued that the neighborhood may be ties required the investment of the political and
civic leadership of a city, alongside that of local
a more manageable unit for intervention and foresidents.
cus (Fishman & Phillips, 1993) than city systems,
which had been the focus of earlier antipoverty
To reach such a scale, RWJF designed UHI to
efforts such as Model Cities.
make it as attractive to citywide leaders as possible. The foundation chose its target population
New Futures, funded by the Annie E. Casey
with the belief that children and youth had the
Foundation in 1988 to reform the funding and
best chance of garnering the widest breadth of
delivery of services to high-risk youth in midsize
support (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation,
cities, illustrated some of the dilemmas of work1994). Charles Royer, Seattle’s former mayor, was
ing at a city level. According to the foundation’s
selected to head the NPO, with the expectation
own reflective report, The Path of Most Resisthat his political experience and knowledge of
tance, numerous obstacles blocked the reformcity government would benefit the initiative. Like
ing of city services, especially the lure for local
other CCIs, each site was allowed to choose their
participants of “expanding good programs rather
own outcomes and strategies. However, RWJF’s
than challenging fundamental arrangements and
rationale for embracing this nonprescriptive tenet
attitudes and seeking basic reforms” (Annie E.
was different. A prescriptive program, they reaCasey Foundation, 1995, p. 15). The foundation’s
soned, would not attract senior policymakers or
experience with New Futures and several other
civic leaders, dooming the effort to get “to scale”
initiatives led them back to the neighborhood,
(Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 1994). Allowwhere they focused on building the capacities of
ing city leaders to shape the character of the effort
local residents and neighborhoods to more readwould broaden its appeal.
ily participate in systems reform in subsequent
initiatives such as Rebuilding Communities and
Making Connections.
How Did UHI’s Planning at the City Level
ated in Weitzman et al., 2002), as well as on other
conversations with staff of the RWJF and its NPO.

RWJF went in a different direction, rejecting the
neighborhood focus in favor of a citywide one.
This was based both on their own interpretation of the problems that were faced by New
Futures and their experience with their own
community-based substance-abuse initiative,
Fighting Back (Lindholm, Ryan, Kadushin, Saxe,
& Brodsky, 2004). RWJF believed that neighborhood efforts, even those that worked with city
government, such as the Hewlett Foundation’s
Neighborhood Improvement Initiative (Brown
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Differ From Planning at the Community
Level?

RWJF embraced a top-down and bottom-up approach to planning (Silver, Weitzman, & Brecher,
2002). They aimed to use the planning process
to identify community priorities and to mobilize
political will among both the political elite and
the citizenry to address them. As noted, many
CCIs, though working with city leaders, have
placed greater emphasis on building the capacities of residents (generally from poorer communities) to participate in reform efforts. UHI placed
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greater emphasis on cultivating engagement
among policymakers and civic leaders and far
less time than other CCIs working with residents.
RWJF encouraged the sites to create structures to
bring the civic elite to the table where decisions
about resources and direction would be made. As
expected by RWJF, mayors and other key leaders
participated in foundation site visits and related
activities.

might be concentrated within neighborhoods,
solutions were likely found at the city level. As a
result, while the UHI sites engaged in bottom-up
planning activities that echoed the work of more
traditional CCIs, community “voice” played a
relatively small role in this initiative. As one city
commissioner noted, “In truth, we had a professional planning process, with a little community
input.”

The emphasis on city leadership was reflected in
the stewardship of the UHI sites throughout the
planning phase. In Oakland, responsibilities were
shared by the mayor’s office, the county executive,
and a large community foundation. In Richmond
the Chamber of Commerce, suburban county officials, and several citywide nonprofit institutions
convened the effort. In Philadelphia, commissioners from youth-serving agencies oversaw the
development of the plan.

Only in Baltimore did the community organizing
activities result in the “community” having direct
power over the final agenda; 7,000 community
residents gathered at a children’s summit to vote
on the priorities for the UHI effort. For the site
director and her staff, turning the final decision
over to community residents was a political strategy, aimed at ensuring a constituent base that was
visible, powerful, organized, and citywide.

CCIs use the experience of neighborhood residents — in their interactions with one another
and with community institutions — to develop
an agenda for change (Chaskin, 2000; Brown,
Butler, & Hamilton, 2001). They have engaged
community leaders, neighborhood service
providers, local religious groups, funders, and
government representatives in assessing community assets, inventorying problems, and
investigating relevant community norms and
values (Foster-Fishman et al., 2006). “Hard” data
has been used less frequently in CCIs because
they are less available at the neighborhood level
and require substantial expertise to manipulate
(Coulton & Hollister, 1998). UHI’s city-level approach required the sites to emphasize such data
to persuade and educate city political and civic
leaders, as well as gather additional data from
community residents.

Grasping the Meaning of “Scale”
In the end, plans that engaged in bottom-up activities but left power and control in the hands of
civic, business, social service, and political leaders
were favored. Those who had focused exclusively
on neighborhood-based approaches were not
funded for implementation. Even the five cities
funded to go forward were asked for substantial
revisions to their plans, which were deemed too
unfocused and too bottom-up to make change at
a citywide scale (Silver et al, 2002).

Prior to CCIs, efforts to involve neighborhoods
in city decision making generally did not change
how decisions were ultimately made (Chaskin &
Abunimah, 1999). Some CCIs have envisioned
a reorientation of decision making through
partnerships between city government and
community residents to restructure how local
government services are delivered. (Hess, 1999;
Chaskin & Abunimah, 1999). In practice, and
with few exceptions (notably the Youth Futures
Using data, the UHI sites identified which
neighborhoods had the greatest concentration of Authority in Savannah, Ga.), many of the policy
changes sought by CCIs have been of a relatively
problems for children and youth. But they were
cautioned that they should not focus attention on small scale, requiring little fundamental change
just one or two neighborhoods, unless the magni- in government’s relationship with communitude of the problems in these neighborhoods was ties (Chaskin & Abunimah, 1999; Kaufman et
large enough to affect citywide outcomes. Further, al., 2006). Though CCIs have sought to improve
social and health service delivery within the target
RWJF advised the sites that while problems
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neighborhoods, transforming such systems for
better delivery in other communities has generally
not been their goal. RWJF envisioned citywide
systems change as UHI’s role.
To be sure, the real meaning of “getting to scale”
was as elusive to RWJF and the NPO as it was to
the sites. In rewriting their plans, the sites were
asked how many children their strategies would
need to reach to “move the needle” in citywide indicators of health and safety; this became known
as the “denominator exercise” (Jellinek, 2008). If,
for instance, a site proposed expanding afterschool participation in order to reduce violence
and teen pregnancy, the denominator exercise
required data regarding existing after-school
slots, rates of participation, and expected impact.
Yet information and data needed to meaningfully
make such calculations were often unavailable. As
a thought experiment, the “denominator exercise” focused attention on the idea of scale, but
as a planning tool, it produced very crude guess
estimates of what it would take to see measurable
changes at the city level.
Moving planning from a neighborhood to citywide focus resulted in the selection of proposed
solutions that required policy change at a level
beyond the neighborhood. In order to make the
needed changes in policy, the sites cultivated
their relationships with the civic elite, even at
the expense of their relationships with neighborhood groups. In implementation, top-down
dominated.

How Did UHI’s Citywide Emphasis Shape
the Character and Roles the Sites Took On?
Similar to the experience of some neighborhoodbased CCIs, most UHI entities set up independent organizations with larger staffs. Each had a
board chaired by a well-recognized city leader. In
Richmond, for instance, the incoming vice-chair
of the Chamber of Commerce led the board for
Youth Matters, the local UHI site. Such leadership
reinforced the coalescing of power in these organizations. It also preserved a focus on changing
systems at the city level, and further encouraged
the UHI sites to assume a different set of roles
than typical of neighborhood CCIs.
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The Big Tent: Coalescing Existing Efforts
With a citywide focus and involvement of city
leadership, the UHI sites were able to gather
other existing initiatives into their tent. For
example, as federal funding for Healthy Start
ended, the UHI sites in Baltimore and Philadelphia absorbed their activities. In Richmond
and Baltimore, the United Way’s Success by Six
became a key component of the UHI effort. Oakland’s Safe Passages assumed responsibility for
the oversight of the city’s designated tax to fund
youth-serving organizations. Detroit’s initiative
picked up a focus on safe neighborhoods from its
lead agency’s previous efforts. The integration of
existing efforts into UHI reduced competition for
funds and provided the opportunity to “rationalize” existing services. The UHI sites strengthened
pre-existing efforts by bringing added resources,
data, technical expertise, and visibility. They offered the opportunity to take such programs “to
scale,” forcefully tackling city and state systems
that regulated and funded many of them. As a senior staffer involved in one such pre-existing effort noted, “We know how to write good grants,
and get funding that way. But we have no idea
how to get government agencies to make sure
that funding for our program will be there – even
though it’s a really good program. That’s [UHI’s]
job … and nobody else is doing that.”

The sites were asked how many
children their strategies would
need to reach to “move the needle”
in citywide indicators of health
and safety.
In contrast, evaluations of neighborhood-based
initiatives suggest a focus on coordinating activities among neighborhood groups and programs
(Chaskin, 2000; Meyer, Blacke, Caine, & Williams
Pryor, 2002; Chaskin & Peters, 2000), rather than
a reorganization of policy and funding streams
that support them. Further, some coordination
efforts have been stymied by turf disputes and
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historic mistrust among neighborhood groups
(Brown et al., 2001; Chaskin, 2000 Sridharan, Go,
Zinzow, Gray, Gutierrez Barrett, 2007). Though
the UHI sites were not immune from turf battles,
their mandate to operate within the citywide
power structure allowed them to be seen, by
some, as necessary and inescapable allies rather
than competitors. One city health commissioner
noted, “I think there is a lot of support from the
community on children’s issues, but a systems
problem has been in getting people to be collaborative instead of competitive. UHI is letting us
tell people to put some old business aside.”

“I think there is a lot of support
from the community on children’s
issues, but a systems problem
has been in getting people to
be collaborative instead of

noted, “We know it’s time to draw in leadership
from the public sector. We can’t do it on our dollars alone.”
Engaging Political Leaders
To change city policies, the UHI sites became
“players” in the cities’ political life. Each of the
sites used mayoral races as opportunities to
increase the visibility of the problems facing children and youth. In Detroit, UHI’s Youth Connection (later, Mayor’s Time) held forums for mayoral
candidates to discuss children’s issues; the winner
ran on a platform that publicly adopted the
Youth Connection agenda as his own. Baltimore
Safe and Sound challenged mayoral candidates
to endorse its goals for children and youth; the
site’s executive director subsequently advised the
incoming administration’s transition team. Sites
helped to educate the voters about referenda and
other electoral issues. Oakland’s Safe Passages
developed materials to educate the public about
local and state referenda on funding for services
for youth.

competitive. UHI is letting us tell

With their neighborhood focus, CCIs have rarely
had — and have rarely sought — the clout needed
people to put some old business
to attract mayoral candidates to their agenda.
They have established relationships with city
aside.”
government to advocate for specific policies, but
have not seen their relationship with city hall
as a principal determinant of their success. Top
Philanthropy’s Role
policymakers need not be involved in creatWith UHI’s citywide focus and leadership, the
power between the initiative and local philanthro- ing small grant opportunities, revitalizing block
py was made more balanced. As with community- associations, gaining access to a local school,
or providing programming in a neighborhood
based efforts, the UHI sites received substantial
support from local foundations, which have been playground. The UHI sites made it a priority to
gain political access and clout in order to change
urged to “invest” in and “partner” with their
public systems. In Detroit, for example, the UHI
communities (Brown & Fiester, 2007). Indeed,
site negotiated a policy change with the school
in many UHI sites, local community and family
district that allowed community groups access to
foundations structured their giving to support
all school buildings throughout the city.
the agenda established through the UHI process.
Yet with UHI, local philanthropic financial supFilling Holes in City Government
port was less important than its civic clout. As
Over time, the sites came to resemble local think
one UHI senior staffer noted, “In some ways, our
tanks, with an emphasis on solving problems
foundations were important more as civic leadof implementation. They analyzed data, invesers, than as funders. We knew the mayor would
return their calls.” In turn, local philanthropy saw tigated problems of service providers, provided
technical assistance, dissected budgets, incubatthe UHI as a way to “shake loose” the dollars in
ed programs, and evaluated and monitored new
public systems. One local foundation president
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models of delivering services. Data and policy
analysts were added to their teams. This work,
unusual for a CCI, was used by city government
officials who, after repeated budget cuts, lacked
staff to do it internally (Weitzman, Silver, Brazill,
2006). A deputy city manager in one UHI site
explained, “I don’t have anyone on staff who can
do these things — look at data, figure out what
else is out there, understand the money. There’s
no one left with those skills at this level of government.”
The Roles Not Taken
The UHI’s citywide focus meant that some of the
important roles that neighborhood CCIs have
assumed went unfilled. For instance, attention
devoted during planning to cultural norms and
values that might influence health and safety outcomes quickly ebbed during implementation. The
value placed on engaging city leaders, and looking
at public funding and policies, relegated concerns
about such norms to the back burner and moved
the sites away from the community’s perspective.
As one possible consequence, several sites overestimated the number of new after-school slots
they could readily fill, because they failed to take
into account parental preferences (Weitzman,
Mijanovich, Silver, Brazill, 2008).
Many CCIs have mobilized community residents to get involved in improving neighborhood
conditions (Hess, 1999). These activities, which
CCIs link to building social capital (Kubisch et al.,
1997), were rare in UHI’s implementation phase.
Mapping community assets, undertaken in three
sites during planning, was abandoned as the sites
moved to changing public systems from the top.
Town meetings and other community forums
vanished early in implementation. Religious
organizations played little role in the governance
and direction of the UHI sites, even as they have
been critical to neighborhood CCIs. In contrast
to many CCIs, the majority of UHI sites did not
regard the building of neighborhood leadership
as a goal. After eight years of the UHI, one city
policymaker noted regretfully, “Our constituency
has really been inside government and service
providers. We don’t have any real relationship to
the community.”
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To a large extent, the UHI sites’ relationships
to neighborhoods were a result of a top-down
approach, in which neighborhood engagement
was limited to specific strategies, only to be
abandoned when these strategies were dropped.
Efforts in Baltimore and Philadelphia to use community engagement to reduce youth violence are
illustrative of this problem. Despite evidence of
success in another city (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, Piehl, 2001) and locally, mayors in both cities
were wary of the neighborhood activism component of this approach. With their cities’ highprofile crime rates, the mayors chose traditional
methods of law enforcement that provided them
with more direct control. Given the mayors’ opposition, the strategy of community engagement
to address youth violence was abandoned. Without leadership in the neighborhoods to mobilize
in favor of such strategies, top-down trumped
bottom-up.
The UHI experience suggests that a city-level focus is not incompatible with a focus on neighborhoods. The relationship to participating neighborhoods is, however, different from the partnerships
typical of neighborhood-based CCIs, in part
because there are too many distressed neighborhoods in distressed cities. Building so many
neighborhood CCIs wasn’t feasible. Instead, the
UHI sites typically focused on policy interventions at the city level, while improving the implementation of programs at the neighborhood level.
With this orientation, they sought out citywide
nonprofit providers, such as the Boys and Girls
Club, which had multiple sites throughout the
city. Still, the reach of such organizations was
limited: some did not work within the neighborhoods most in need, while others had followed,
at least in part, their constituencies out to the
suburbs. These citywide providers sometimes
sought to pull resources to other of their locations, even as they were outside areas of greatest
need. The UHI sites found that they needed to
negotiate relationships with community-based organizations (CBOs) and providers serving single
neighborhoods. As these groups were inevitably
battling against each other for resources, working
with neighborhood groups was difficult as well.
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How Did the Citywide Focus Shape the
Strategies and Activities Within the Sites?
Despite the nonprescriptive nature of the
initiative, the sites selected similar strategies:
expanding and improving the quality of afterschool opportunities, reducing violence affecting
youth, providing services to high-risk families
with young children, and ensuring early reading
achievement. While neighborhood CCIs have
undertaken similar strategies (Local Investment
Commission, 2002; Meyer et al., 2002; Chaskin,
2000), UHI’s citywide focus led them into the guts
of city and state government and away from the
neighborhoods.
Improving Service Delivery in the City
Like other CCIs, the UHI sites embraced coordination of public systems at the neighborhood
level, but pursued it in a more traditional topdown approach to devolution by co-locating services and helping them function better (Chaskin
& Abunimah, 1999; Silver, 2004). For instance,
rather than working with neighborhood caseworkers to develop referral systems, Philadelphia
Safe and Sound supported the development and
implementation of an electronic records system
to provide caseworkers across agencies immediate access to documentation about the services
families were receiving.
Coordinating public services proved more
important to some arenas than others, since the
sites were wading into areas, such as after-school
services, where systems do not exist. CCIs can
circumvent this problem within a single neighborhood by connecting a CBO and a school, finding philanthropic and city funding, and cobbling
together a new program or two. However, at the
city level, linking agencies was more cumbersome, funding streams were more fragmented
and confusing, and issues of facilities and capacity
were daunting. Rather than coordinate services,
the UHI sites found themselves trying to create a
system, or at least citywide policies, to rationalize
activities. For example, Oakland’s Safe Passages
blended TANF monies, school truancy funds, and
behavioral health dollars to fund school coordinators to link young people to an array of services
inside and outside the school building.
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With UHI’s emphasis on public systems and citywide services, improving government efficiency,
rarely a goal of CCIs, became central. In Philadelphia, an annual Children’s Report Card charted
the city’s performance in regard to multiple
health and safety outcomes and government services. In Baltimore, Safe and Sound worked with
the local human services coordinating body to
build their capacity to target funding and improve
the quality of services delivered. Despite the slow
pace of incremental reform, the UHI sites saw no
way around changing public systems from within
if they were to achieve their goals.
Working With State Government
The sites’ work at the city level gave them access
and visibility at the state level as well; the necessity of such access had been originally underestimated by RWJF. State government has a
great deal of control over the human service and
educational systems affecting citywide outcomes
for children and youth (Brecher, Searcy, Silver,
Weitzman, 2004). Thus, the UHI sites needed to
work with state government and agencies, further
pulling it away from neighborhood engagement.
The site director for Richmond’s Youth Matters
was asked to chair the statewide task force on
educational reform. The site director for Detroit’s
Mayor’s Time was asked to chair the statewide
task force on expanding after-school opportunities. Most significantly, the Baltimore site convinced the governor’s office to sign a “compact”
allowing the city to keep and reinvest monies
saved through effective prevention strategies.

What Are the Challenges Created by
Working at the City Level?
Dancing With Elected Officials
UHI’s experience in fielding a citywide CCI offers
some cautionary lessons, especially in regard to
leadership. First, from its earliest stages, UHI
forged strong relations to mayors, helping the
sites gain access to other civic leaders. Yet close
relations with a current mayor meant the sites
had to struggle to navigate mayoral change. Being
too closely identified with an outgoing mayor is
problematic, while being too outside the mayor’s
priorities could make the site irrelevant. Strong
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and lasting buy-in from philanthropic and business leaders helped to ease mayoral transitions
in some sites, since every mayor needed such
support. Greater emphasis on developing citizen
constituents, e.g., troops on the ground, helped
one site through a mayoral transition; it might
have benefitted the others.
Negotiating Levels of Government
Second, the public sector is far more fragmented
than was initially acknowledged in the UHI
approach. With an emphasis on citywide outcomes, the UHI sites quickly came to focus on
city government. Yet, the sites also contended
with independent school boards, county government, and state government in their efforts. The
governmental systems that touch the lives of children and youth are complex and involve multiple
jurisdictions and funding streams. More attention
to the role of state government as funders and
regulators of services and greater appreciation for
the independence of school districts might have
enabled the UHI sites to move their strategies
along more quickly.
Third, some public systems are more amenable
to multisector approaches than others. The
public health and social service systems, accustomed to contracting with community providers,
proved easier to engage in reform efforts than did
criminal justice or school systems. One county
supervisor remarked, “Our schools are mired in
a defensive posture and I don’t see that changing
soon.” High crime and dropout rates placed both
of these systems under intense scrutiny; this may
have deterred them from engaging in what they
viewed as experimental approaches. Furthermore,
leadership in these scrutinized systems changed
frequently — school superintendents and police
chiefs came and went — making meaningful
engagement even more difficult.
Getting to Scale Isn’t Program Replication
Writ Large
The UHI sites learned that there is no formula for
turning promising programs into citywide practice. Some CCIs have succeeded in implementing
innovative programs in after-school services, interventions with high-risk families, or alternatives
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to incarceration. But the literature is thin when
it comes to the question of scale. Addressing
problems “at scale” went beyond program replication; the sites had to deliver technical assistance,
reform funding mechanisms, improve program
monitoring, develop a trained workforce, build or
revitalize infrastructure, and create demand for
such reforms. Accomplishing each step requires
myriad skills and knowledge, and support for
them was insufficient. Further, scale required
rationalizing services across the city; it sometimes
required the closing of underused facilities and
institutions in some of the city’s poorest and most
depopulated areas. Given the long-held and intense racial divides that continue to plague these
cities, such decisions were particularly fraught.

Greater emphasis on developing
citizen constituents, e.g., troops on
the ground, helped one site through
a mayoral transition; it might have
benefitted the others.
Engaging Civic Leadership in Declining Cities
Neighborhood CCIs have viewed the building of local leadership as integral to their approach. In some
sense, UHI presumed a deep bench of civic elite
that could be mobilized to steer the reform. In these
declining cities, that bench turned out to be thinner
than expected. Many large businesses and nonprofits had decamped along with affluent residents.
Further, even once civic leaders were engaged, UHI
sites had to work to retain their interest. The NPO’s
Fellows Program nurtured this leadership, and site
directors uniformly praised this work.

Conclusion
UHI demonstrated that multisector collaboration
at the city level can garner sufficient political clout
to make meaningful changes in policies, programs,
and institutions serving children and youth. While
borrowing from and building on the neighborhood CCI model, UHI evolved into an initiative
that was far more political, focusing on citywide
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policies and systems, and much less that of community perspective and voice. Neighborhoods, or
communities, exist at the subjurisdictional level;
they do not have control over public policies or
budgets, nor are they governed by elected leaders.
By choosing a larger, geo-political jurisdiction as
the focus of the UHI, RWJF encouraged the sites
to take on a somewhat different set of roles than
those of community CCIs and also enabled them
to make inroads that are typically impossible at
the community level. At the same time, a citywide
focus left the sites scrambling with unforeseen issues, such as the role of the state and a diminished
civic elite, and grappling with the not-yet-resolved
question of getting to scale.
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